Introduction

Overview
The controversy on the future of ICANN puts into sharp focus a number of questions: How shall the Internet be governed? Is it possible to govern the Internet at all? Who shall govern, and how? This paper does not address all these questions in depth. However, it is useful to define this paper's framework in terms of these questions.
How shall the Internet be governed? At the heart of this question is an age-old debate on the role of the State. This question is presented by Gibbons as involving a fundamental choice from among: no regulation; self-regulation; and Government regulation. Gibbons chooses self-regulation -because it 'best effectuates both the vision of the founders of cyberspace and the pragmatic needs of the real world.' 3 The approach taken in this paper is to briefly examine the theory by presenting the traditional arguments for and against self-regulation (Part 2), and to briefly examine the practice by comparing the EU and US approaches to Internet regulation (Part 3).
Is it possible to govern the Internet at all?
It is difficult to reconcile regulation by diverse jurisdictions with the cross-border aspects of the Internet. In the early years of the Internet, Johnson and Post popularised the notion that cyberspace is governed by norms of its own, independent of the law of the State, and concluded that Governments should not regulate cyberspace. 4 For some time, the conventional wisdom was that Governments were helpless to regulate the Internet. Experience has taught otherwise -the Internet has proven to be a highly controllable medium. Since 1996, there has been a steady increase in Government regulation of the Internet. Civil libertarians are disturbed by the intrusive nature of emerging Internet regulation, particularly those granting security agencies wider powers of surveillance. A parallel development is increasingly aggressive legislation 5 and litigation 6 ostensibly for the protection of intellectual property rights. No single Government can effectively regulate the Internet. However, it is now recognised that there are many choke points in this network of networks 7 that enable a determined Government to have credible control. Governments can target what Swire calls the 'elephants' (i.e. large software companies and content providers, ISPs, network owners, e-businesses), instead of the elusive 'mice' (i.e., individual Internet pirates, pornographers, or swindlers). 8 An example is Napster, which was sued to the point of bankruptcy by the US recording industry, while millions of individual Internet users who swapped illegal copies of music files were left alone. 9 For purposes of analysis, treating the Internet as a monolithic structure is extremely unwieldy. The approach taken in this paper is to use Lessig's paradigm of the three 'layers' of the Internet, namely, the 'physical' layer at the bottom, the 'code' layer in the middle, and the 'content' layer on top 10 (Part 4). The paper will focus on the regulation of the 'code' layer with particular regard to technical standards (Part 5 and 6).
Who shall govern and how?
Rather than attempt to answer this question as a matter of first principles, the approach taken in this paper is: (1) to assess existing mechanisms for self-regulation, namely: ICANN, the Internet Engineering Task Force and the World Wide Web Consortium (Parts 5 and 8); and (2) to attempt to draw lessons from the governance of another global network, international banking (Part 7). While there is extensive literature on domain names and associated intellectual property issues 11 , it is not intended to discuss these aspects at length.
Objective
The starting point of this paper is the proposition that: ' [t] 13 Gould, M, 'Locating Internet governance: Lessons from the standards process', Chapter 10, in Marsden, C., Regulating the Global Information Society (2000) , at p. 193, emphasis added.
14 Nikolinakos, N., 'Nature and Scope of Content Regulation for On-Line Services' (2000) C.T.L.R. 6(5), 126, at p. 127. 15 National Consumer Council, 'Models of self-regulation: an overview of models in business and the professions', October 1999. 16 Froomkin, A.M., 'Semi-private international rulemaking: Lessons learned from the WIPO domain name process', Chapter 11, in Marsden, C., Regulating the Global Information Society (2000) , at p. 211. 17 Price, M. and Verhulst, S., 'Charting the course of self-regulation on the Internet in a global environment', Chapter 3, in Marsden, C., Regulating the Global Information Society (2000) , at p. 66. 18 National Consumer Council, supra, N. 15, at p. 4.
of the Internet are therefore also social choices.' 12 Gould observes that: 'As the Internet has grown, the debate about its governance and regulation has become more significant. . . . At its heart, however, are questions about the infrastructure. The infrastructure itself is founded on standards. Those standards, therefore, are the basic subject matter of Internet governance.' 13 In the foregoing context, this paper will endeavour to assess existing forms of self-regulation in the code layer; and to consider whether self-regulation should continue to be the dominant regulatory form in setting Internet technical standards.
Definition and classification
Who is the 'self' in Internet self-regulation? Again, it is good to go back to what is 'self-regulation'? European definitions are elastic and include: 'regulated self-regulation' as contrasted to 'unregulated self-regulation' 14 ; 'legal self-regulation' as contrasted to 'voluntary self-regulation'; and 'selfregulation within a legislative framework' or 'co-regulation'. 15 Across the Atlantic, Froomkin takes a narrow view:
True self-regulation excludes the participation of a public body. Thus, much of what is loosely called 'self-regulation' is not in fact selfregulation. For example, US stock exchanges engage in so-called 'self-regulation' but their rules are subject to approval by the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Self-regulation can be found in the professions (i.e., solicitors, physicians) as well as in business (i.e., banking, insurance). Self-regulation has also been used to develop product and service standards, from paper sizes to accounting principles. As a practical matter, it is rare for self-regulation to have no relationship at all to Government regulation and enforcement. 17 It is nonetheless useful to adopt this definition:
Self-regulation means in essence that rules which govern behaviour in the market are developed, administered, and enforced by the people (or their direct representatives) whose behaviour is to be governed.
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The 'self' consists of those persons and entities that have meaningful participation in the IETF, the W3C, and ICANN -most will easily qualify as 'elephants'. The overwhelming majority of individual Internet users are 'mice' who are rule-takers. They participate in self-regulation only in the most remote sense.
Ogus classifies self-regulation according to the following variables: (1) monopoly power -whether it regulates all suppliers or only some; (2) formality -whether it derives legitimacy from a legislative framework; (3) legal status -whether the rules have binding force; and (4) transparencywhether outsiders participate in rule formulation, enforcement, and supervision. 19 Ogus also classifies self-regulation by the manner of its adoption: (1) unilateral codes of conduct; (2) customer charters; (3) unilateral sectoral codes; (4) negotiated codes; (5) trade association codes approved by a government office, i.e., the Office of Fair Trading; (6) 'recognised codes'; (7) official codes and guidance; and (8) 
Arguments for self-regulation
The classic arguments in favour of self-regulation are as follows: (1) a self-regulatory body can have better expertise and technical knowledge, and is in a better position to formulate and interpret standards 23 ; (2) access to expertise and technical knowledge reduces monitoring and enforcement costs; (3) the costs to practitioners (or firms) is reduced, as interaction with the regulatory body is likely to be fostered by mutual trust; (4) the less formal process and rules of a self-regulatory body reduces the cost of amending standards, including costs attributable to delay; and (5) the costs of the self-regulatory body are borne by the relevant trade or activity, not by taxpayers. 24 Governments may support self-regulation in the belief that heavy-handed regulation can deter investment and innovation. 
Arguments against self-regulation
The classic arguments against self-regulation are as follows: (1) selfregulation results in the acquisition of power by groups which are not accountable through constitutional channels; (2) the rules adopted by the self-regulatory body may not have democratic legitimacy; (3) the selfregulatory body may adopt rules that affect not only its members, but third parties; and (4) it often occurs that the self-regulatory body is responsible for rule-making, adjudication, and enforcement -this is a breach of the separation of powers doctrine. 28 Lack of accountability and democratic legitimacy are the principal criticisms by Froomkin 29 and Mueller 30 against Internet 'self-regulation' via ICANN. Even Lessig is wary of 'private' control of the Internet. 31 The general direction of their analysis supports more Government regulation of the Internet.
Economists may object to self-regulation on several counts: (1) the self-regulatory body can act as a cartel, establish anti-competitive conditions, and generate rents (exorbitant profits) for its members 32 ; (2) the self-regulatory body can establish barriers to entry that distort competition; and (3) self-regulation coupled with the absence of external constraints, facilitates rent-seeking behaviour. 33 The legal profession provides interesting examples of self-regulation abetting anti-competitive practices. In the 18th century, the New York bar was reported to have made a decision not to 34 Consumer Council, supra, N. 15. 35 40 Notwithstanding the difference in emphasis, it is clear that EU and US policymakers intend Government regulation and self-regulation to be complementary.
The extensive body of EU regulation includes directives on data protection 41 , databases 42 , copyright 43 , privacy in telecommunications 44 , distance selling 45 , encryption and electronic signatures 46 ; electronic commerce 47 , and electronic money. 48 The extensive body of US regulation includes: the Communications Decency Act (1997) 49 ; the No Electronic Theft Act (1997) 50 ; the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (1998) 51 ; the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or DMCA (1998) 52 ; the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (1999) 53 ; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (2000) 54 ; and the USA Patriot Act (2001). Competition law is proving to be a powerful policy instrument. A notable example is the prosecution of Microsoft for alleged anti-competitive conduct against a competing Internet browser. 55 The partial settlement adopted in November 2001 resulted in changes to the design of the latest version of the Windows operating system, XP. 56 This was roughly the equivalent of the US Department of Justice telling Microsoft how to write its code. US regulators approved the 1998 merger of MCI and Worldcom subject to the divestment of Internet assets to a third party, Cable and Wireless. 57 The approved subject to the condition of open access. 58 Gould has described the EU approach to Internet regulation as centralised and governmental, and the US approach as light-handed and sensitive to commercial interests. 59 However, Gould's description of the EU regime -'centralised and governmental' -is one that increasingly describes the US regime.
4 Self-regulation in the Internet context 'Our hands-off approach wasn't entirely a choice. The reality is that the Internet grew so fast that policy-makers could not have written a code to govern it even of they wanted to.' 61 To test Marsden's statement, it is useful to examine the extent of regulation in each layer of the Internet.
The Physical Layer. -Telecommunications and cable TV networks are the physical backbone of the Internet. Telecommunications and broadcasting are highly regulated industries. Thus, Governments may be considered as the principal actors in regulating the physical layer. However, in the global context, Government regulation over the physical layer is fragmented over many jurisdictions.
The Code Layer. -The principal actors in regulating the code layer are the IETF, the W3C and ICANN. There is no body of law that governs the code layer as such, which is physically intangible. For the time being, self-regulation dominates the code layer. This is more a matter of default, rather than design. The standards of the code layer are global, crossborder, and pervasive. This makes the code layer an attractive target for tinkering by various commercial and political interests.
The Content Layer. -A well established body of law regulates content (i.e., print, radio, TV, movies). These laws deal with: the publication of obscene articles 62 ; the distribution or possession of child pornography 63 ; the transmission of grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or menacing messages 64 ; the piracy of copyrighted material and dealing with pirated material 65 ; unlawful procurement, processing, or disclosure of data 66 ; harassment 67 ; defamation 68 ; deception, and blackmail. 69 Although Government regulation is dominant in the content layer, it is fragmented over many jurisdictions.
In a hypothetical world with only four legal jurisdictions, cross-border Internet regulation can be represented as follows: In the above model, Lessig's 'layers' are shown horizontally, while the jurisdictions represented by countries A to D are shown vertically. What this simple model conveys is that Internet regulation is not an 'all or nothing' debate. What has evolved to date can best be described as a complex tapestry of Government regulation and self-regulation. 73 A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (1997), emphasis added. 74 Gould, supra, N. 13, at p. 203. 75 Ibid. 76 See Part 1.3 of this paper. 77 In the case if the W3C, the cost of membership is US$50,000 per year. Garfinkel, S., 'The Web's Unelected Government', Technology Review, November/December 1998, p. 38.
Self-regulation in the code layer
US policy supports self-regulation in the code layer. 'The marketplace, not governments, should determine technical standards and other mechanisms for interoperability on the Internet. Technology is moving rapidly and governments' attempts to establish technical standards to govern the Internet would only risk inhibiting technological innovation.'
73 The IETF, the W3C, and ICANN are the principal mechanisms for developing Internet technical standards. This section sets the scene for a more detailed discussion of the IETF and W3C in Part 5, and ICANN in Part 6.
The IETF develops communications standards for the code layer. These standards help ensure the interoperability of the hardware and software connected to the Internet. 74 The W3C develops document standards for the World Wide Web. These standards help to ensure that text, graphics, audio, and video are in a format accessible and 'displayable' throughout the World Wide Web. 75 ICANN develops standards for the Internet's domain name and addressing system. These standards assign a unique identity and address to individual computers and users of the Internet, and ensure that data is transmitted to, or retrieved, from the correct address.
Applying the variables identified by Ogus to classify self-regulation 76 : (1) The IETF, the W3C, and ICANN have a high degree of monopoly power, as non-compliance with standards can result in exclusion from the Internet; (2) Self-regulation by the IETF, the W3C, and ICANN have a low degree of formality, as they do not derive legitimacy from a legislative framework; (3) The standards issued by the IETF, the W3C, and ICANN have low legal status, as these are not prescribed by law; (4) The IETF, the W3C and ICANN are notionally transparent in the sense that there is extensive disclosure (primarily through public websites) of proposals considered and standards adopted. However, there are barriers to effective participation such as the highly technical nature of the issues, or the cost of effective participation.
77 Self-regulation in the code layer may be represented as follows: 78 Self-regulation of the code layer can operate with a high degree of autonomy. The subject matter requires technical expertise. There is little need for Government enforcement as compliance results in inclusion, and non-compliance results in exclusion. 78 However, existing methods of self-regulation in the code layer benefit from direct or indirect Government sponsorship in the form of supportive policies, or at least a legitimating tolerance. Lessig 79 Government interest in the code layer has already manifested itself in such areas as encryption, digital rights management, and the governance of country level domains. This suggests that Governments can take on the role of 'code writer', albeit indirectly.
Self-regulation in the content layer
Self-regulation in the 'content layer' seeks to achieve different policy objectives, including: the control of illegal and harmful content; consumer protection; data protection; and control of spam. For example, the EU Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet calls for: the adoption 80 Decision 276, Adopting a multiannual community action plan on promoting safer use of the Internet (1999) O.J. L33/1, emphasis added. of codes of conduct; enforcement by self-regulatory bodies that are backed by government enforcement and implementing legislation; and the use of self-rating, labelling and filtering. 80 Self-regulation in the content layer may be represented as follows: 
The Internet Engineering Task Force
The IETF develops standards that allow the Internet to function as a global network. These include the Transfer Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), and the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). 82 The IETF evolved from one of the task forces established by the Internet Activities Board (IAB) in 1986. The IAB has been described as 'the co-ordinating committee for Internet design, engineering and management, composed of researchers and professionals with a technical interest in the health and evolution of the Internet'. 83 The IETF has been described as an 'independent, unincorporated, international standards body of continually floating membership'. 84 The term 'IETF' refers to a few hundred individuals, chiefly software engineers, who have taken an interest in the development of the Internet. 85 The The early telegraph and telephone companies appreciated that the value of their networks increased with greater interconnection. This required the adoption of technical standards that led to the establishment by treaty of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 1865. 89 In contrast to the ITU, IETF members do not represent sovereign countries. The IETF is also characterised by the lack of formal hierarchy, extensive use of e-mail, decision-making by consensus, and an informal culture. 90 In the early 1990s, the ITU and the IETF clashed with competing e-mail standards (X.400 and TCP/IP 94 Like the IETF, the W3C is not an incorporated entity. For legal contracts the W3C is represented by the MIT, INRIA, and Keio University. 95 The W3C has been described, half seriously, as 'the Web's unelected Government'. 96 Its de facto constitution is a Process Document which describes the W3C's mission, structure, general policies, and procedures, including time limits for the consideration of proposals and voting rules. 97 The W3C has developed more than forty technical specifications for Web-based text, audio, video, and graphics. 98 This work has been highly praised. The W3C formally adheres to the principle of decision-making by consensus. However, compared to the IETF, the W3C's decision-making process is considered as more 'top-down'. Berners-Lee has been described as the W3C's 'benevolent dictator'.
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The W3C's work in the 'Technology and Society' domain has triggered controversy. The most controversial W3C initiatives have been the Platform Independent Content Selection (PICS) protocol, 100 and the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P). 101 The W3C developed PICS as a response to the US Communications Decency Act (CDA). PICS is envisaged to allow content providers to rate themselves, and for web users to selectively block access. In hearings on the constitutionality of the CDA, PICS was used to support the argument that the online industry could police itself without external censorship. 102 The W3C developed P3P as a response to a threat from the US Department of Commerce that regulations would be forthcoming unless the online industry established credible measures to protect personal privacy.
103 P3P is envisaged to allow content providers to publish their privacy policies in machine readable form, and for web users to define their privacy preferences. P3P would alert the user of any mismatch between the provider's privacy policy and the user's privacy preference. 104 The W3C formally issued the P3P specifications on 16th April 2002. 
The problem of 'capture'
The standards process is vulnerable to competition problems if a participant 'captures' the standard-setting process by claiming IP rights over an existing or proposed standard. In the Internet context, the problem of capture is exacerbated due to the operation of network effects -the market tends toward a single dominant standard that enables the greatest interconnection. 106 This tension between standards and IP rights predates the Internet. Standards bodies like the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO), the British Standards Institution (BSI) 107 , and the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 108 have well-established procedures for coping with this problem. The BSI procedure is fairly representative of the procedure followed by standards bodies. 109 The BSI procedure provides that: 110 . . .
g. If the patent is foreign, then an agreement should be sought with the owner that the licences will be granted on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.'
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The IETF requires disclosure of IP rights governing any proposed standard. If there are IP rights associated with a proposed standard, the IETF will seek to obtain a written assurance from the IP rights holder that once the standard is adopted, any party that desires to use the standard can do so 'under openly specified, reasonable, non-discriminatory terms'. This is the so-called RAND approach. If the proponent does not provide the requested assurance, IETF rules provide that 'the IESG may defer approval where a delay may facilitate the obtaining of such assurances'. The most controversial ICANN issues involved the DNSO (domain name policy), the At Large Membership (representation, democratic legitimacy) and the GAC (role of Governments, accountability). There has been less controversy with respect to the ASO and the PSO, whose remit is largely technical in nature, and less likely to impact on commercial and political interests. Internet users elected five of the 19 ICANN Directors in an online election in 2000. These directors are supposed to represent the At Large membership, i.e. the general public of Internet users. However, out of an estimated 300 million Internet users at that time, only 33,000 (or 0.01%) cast their votes. 120 The EU has extended its qualified support for ICANN, but has expressed its concern on certain issues including: 'the nature of, and arrangements for, balanced and equal oversight of some of ICANN's activities by public authorities'; 'the rules to govern generic domains'; 'the redelegation of certain ccTLDs to another manager at the request of the Government concerned', and 'the transfer of the management of the root server system from the US Department of Commerce to ICANN, under appropriate international supervision by public authorities.'
121 The EU's relationship with ICANN can be best described as one of 'critical engagement'.
Criticisms against ICANN
Froomkin argues that the use of ICANN to regulate the Internet, instead of an executive agency, violates fundamental values and policies designed to ensure democratic control over the use of government power. He believes this sets a precedent that risks being expanded into other regulatory activities.
122 Moreover, the US Department of Commerce's use of ICANN to make rules violates (a) the requirements under the Administrative Practices Act 123 for notice and comment in rule making, and judicial review; and (b) the Constitution's non-delegation doctrine. 125 Mueller, M., 'ICANN and Internet Governance: Sorting through the debris of 'self-regulation'', 1(6) Mueller believes that the self-regulatory regime being constructed by ICANN is far more centralised and controlling in nature than the pre-ICANN Internet. 125 Mueller contends that control of the DNS is being used to create a new global regime providing for expanded rights to names. ICANN and WIPO have stated that their goal is only to preserve existing rights. However, the property rights that are being created are often stronger than, and different from traditional legal rights in names. 126 Mueller's criticism that the US Department of Commerce devolved state power to ICANN, echoes the administrative due process and nondelegation arguments raised by Froomkin. 127 The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) contends that the ICANN governance structure is not appropriately representative of the public voice, and that non-commercial interests are underrepresented. 128 The CDT argues that ICANN has failed to achieve the vision of a new form of international, non-governmental, bottom-up, consensus driven, and self-organising structure for key Internet functions. 
ICANN's achievements
The US Department of Commerce White Paper envisaged a new framework for DNS management that would address the following issues: competition in domain naming registration; resolution of conflicts between trademark owners and domain name holders; a more formal and robust management structure for the Internet; participation by non-US stakeholders in Internet co-ordination; and the addition of new top level domains. It was also envisioned that the governing board of the private non-profit corporation that would assume responsibility for managing the DNS would reflect the international character of the Internet, and have a work style defined by bottom-up and consensus-based decision-making. these companies over ICANN policy-making. There is also resistance to ICANN's efforts to generate funds from domain name registrations. For example, European TLD registries, including .uk operator Nominet, are refusing to pay fees they consider unfair.
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In 2001, companies dissatisfied with ICANN's TLD procedures launched competing systems. New.net Inc. offers alternative (and ICANNunapproved) domain names, and was able to sign up BulkRegister.com (ranked no.4 in terms of market share) as a reseller. 137 A German group called the Business Oriented Root Network (BORoon), is also offering alternative domain extensions and is establishing its own root server. BORoon's CEO, Pascal Bernhard, claims (somewhat implausibly) that it is not seeking to compete with ICANN but intends to work with it. ICANN has accused these renegade registries of trying to break the Internet. 141 According to Lynn, national government participation is 'essential to end the Sisyphean effort of searching for a workable public 142 144 The transition to the new structure began in December 2002, and is a work in progress. ICANN also adopted new Bylaws that took effect on 26 June 2003. The details of the Blueprint and the new structure will not be discussed at length in this paper. However, it is useful to highlight three key points:
a. Government representation -The proposal for Governments to nominate five directors has been dropped. There has been no further talk of a 'global public-private partnership'. Governments will continue to participate through the GAC. The GAC will be represented in the ICANN Board by one of six 'non-voting Liaisons' (Art. 6, Sec. 9, Bylaws). For example, the international letter of credit is governed by norms codified in the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Most states have nonetheless subjected the international banking community (and letters of credit) to municipal law. However, the international banking community does not complain because this law: (1) establishes the required There is no global regulator for the international banking industry. The closest equivalent to a global regulator for banking is the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The Basel Committee has a narrow focus -the regulation of the world's largest international banks. The central bank governors of the G10 nations established the Basel Committee in 1974, after two large international banks failed. The founding mandate of the Committee was a simple press release issued through the Bank of International Settlements. The Committee aims to establish minimum standards of financial regulation and monitoring adherence to those standards by member countries. It also serves as 'a forum for on-going co-operation between member countries on banking supervisory matters'. The Committee issues policy statements for effective banking supervision which serve as guidelines for member countries and for non-member countries whose members are striving for global acceptance. The recommendations of the Committee are not legally enforceable, and its policy statements are considered 'soft law'. 154 In 1993, an informal network called a Tripartite Group was created. The Group was composed of representatives of the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS). 155 Tripartite Group aims to address issues associated with the international convergence of banking, securities and insurance industries. This was an acknowledgement that the traditional boundaries of financial regulation were getting blurred. These steps were said to represent the 'building blocks of the international regulatory convergence process.' 158 Zaring has identified a number of common characteristics among the Basel Committee, IOSCO and IAIS: (1) Substate actors -The members of these organisations are not national governments, but substate actors; (2) Informal creation -The organisations were not created by treaty or ratified charter; (3) Flexibility -The organisations have an informal approach to internal rules and restrictions; (4) Decentralisation -The organisations are characterised by decentralised organisation and action; (5) SecrecyThe organisations conduct much of their business in secret; (6) Ambiguous legal force -None of the organisations can promulgate binding laws or regulations. Implementation of the 'gentlemen's agreements' occurs at the national level. Internet transactions may be difficult to compare with international banking transactions, as the latter can often be characterised as 'elephant' to 'elephant' transactions. Letters of credit are again a good example, where two or more banks effectively act as intermediaries to the crossborder seller and buyer. The experience of international banking suggests some insights on how global Internet governance is evolving. Selfregulation is the first regulatory form to emerge both at the domestic and global level. As Internet use has became more important to domestic economies, there is a corresponding increase in the level of Government regulation. Government regulation and self-regulation of the Internet need not be characterised by irreconcilable conflict or rigid separation. The cross-border aspects of Internet transactions result in legal ambiguities. To respond to these ambiguities, the level of global co-operation among (public and private) regulators has increased. This co-operation 160 may result in new forms of global self-regulation, and potentially, agreement among Governments on a new global regulatory framework. In the absence of an international treaty to underpin this global co-operation -contracts and soft law will fill the void. Global co-operation by public and private regulators will tend to focus on the largest international market players.
There is a tendency to hype-up the international aspect of the Internet. However, it should not be forgotten that the Internet is also a medium for domestic transactions. It should not be surprising that in the UK, the top e-commerce sites are those of UK companies. 160 Thus, the Internet will always possess a significant domestic character that makes it susceptible to national regulation. Domestic Internet regulation should not be a problem provided these are sensitive to the needs of Internet users and e-commerce, and is harmonised with international business practice.
Lessons from ICANN
Life lies in a narrow band somewhere between the two extremes of absolute rigidity and absolute chaos. Any living thing, or living organization, has to position itself in the life zone.
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The Internet has changed considerably. To simplify analysis, it is useful to distinguish between the 'embryonic period' and the 'commercial period'. The precise dividing line is debatable. In 1987, the National Science Foundation launched the NSFNET, which linked 4,000 research institutions. In 1990, the Department of Defense phased out ARPANET. In 1992, the US Congress then gave NSF authority to allow commercial activity on the NSFNET. 162 The following table illustrates the growth of websites in the .com domain: It was not until January 1996 that .com sites comprised 50% of websites in all domains. Thus, it can be fairly said that the 'embryonic period' covers the 1970s up to 1996. The 'commercial period' covers 1996 to the present. While the IETF and the W3C were established during the embryonic period, ICANN was established during the commercial period.
The embryonic Internet
The embryonic Internet originated as part of US research and development efforts to gain technological and military superiority during the Cold War. The 'community' was relatively small and homogeneous. In the context of a Cold War environment, there was implicit political and ideological alignment. The community spirit was essentially one of collaboration, not competition. The Internet was not in the mainstream of (US) society, and therefore, there were no open policy debates on its impact on society. The Internet community's small size, homogeneity, and collaborative spirit fostered a high level of trust. The community had a large degree of autonomy in terms of technical issues (i.e. development of standards) because of its superior expertise. However, despite the community's relative autonomy, there was a point of control, the US Government agencies which directed, funded and awarded the research contracts. Thus, effective incentives and sanctions were available from both the community (i.e., inclusion and exclusion) and in appropriate cases the Government (i.e., award and termination of research contracts).
The commercial Internet
The commercial Internet is radically different. There are more Internet users (today estimated at 500 million), and the distribution of users is 169 Excerpt from the advocacy group Public Knowledge 'dedicated to fortifying and defending a vibrant 'information commons''. http://www.publicknowledge.org/news/media/media-responses.php. The problems of ICANN are complex, and stem from a number of factors that include: the timing of its creation, high expectations, a poorly defined constituency, and the absence until recently of a formal policy development process. Compared to the relatively homogeneous and US-centric 'embryonic Internet', the 'excessively diverse interests' inherent in the commercial Internet will continue to be a major challenge to ICANN. In its Blueprint for Reform, ICANN took the bold step of affirming that it has a global policy role. This role is intended to be limited to those policy areas that are reasonably related to ICANN's technical mission. 170 Although controversial, this is a step that deserves support from the global Internet community. It is also a challenge to ICANN's critics to develop a credible alternative to ICANN. In order to succeed, ICANN will require strong leadership. It is too early to assess the reforms that were initiated in 2002, and it remains to be seen whether the new Policy Development Process will stand the test of time.
Self-regulation to date by the IETF, the W3C and ICANN should ultimately be judged by the result. No one has seriously argued that a US Government agency, or an EU body, or an inter-governmental body like the ITU could have done a better job in developing the standards that made the Internet and the World Wide Web possible. So far, the result speaks for itself -res ipsa loquitor. The work of the IETF, the W3C and ICANN has delivered tangible results in terms of improvements in the Internet's stability, inter-operability, technical performance, reliability, range of features, and simplicity.
